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With improved affordability and plenty of 
support from the central and state 
governments, solar irriga on pumps are 
slowly capturing the interest of farmers in 
Bihar. Launched in 2012, Bihar Saur Kran  
Sinchai Yojna (BSKSY) offers up to 90 per 
cent capital subsidy on solar pumps to 
smallholder farmers. Based on recent field 
studies in Bihar, this highlight presents an 
early appraisal of BSKSY and its impact on 
increasing irrigated area and expanding 
access to affordable irriga on among small 
and marginal farmers. We argue that rather 
than the current policy of offering high 
capital subsidies on solar irriga on pumps, 
compe  ve solar irriga on service markets 
can be er serve the objec ve of providing 
affordable irriga on to small and marginal 
farmers.
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1. ECONOMIC SCARCITY DESPITE NATURAL ABUNDANCE
Despite si ng on one of the world's best groundwater 
aquifers, farmers in Bihar face economic water scarcity due 
to the lack of rural electrifica on and the high price of diesel. 
Over the last decade, irrigated area in Bihar has grown by a 
mere 5 per cent per annum (GoB 2014). The extent to which 
economic water scarcity limits agrarian growth is illustrated 
by the fact that only 37 per cent of the cul vated area is 
cropped more than once; the corresponding figures for 
Punjab, Haryana and even neighbouring West Bengal lie 
between 85 and 90 per cent (FAI 2011). Some scholars have 
argued that mul ple cropping in Bihar is constrained by 
cultural and clima c factors while others have argued that 
recurrent floods and water logging restrict winter cul va on 
while the severe heat discourages summer cul va on. 
However, these arguments seem weak when we compare 
Bihar's cropping intensity with that of neighbouring West 
Bengal which faces similar severity of heat but where boro 
(summer) paddy is highly produc ve. 
In 2008, the government of Bihar started a condi onal cash 
transfer scheme to provide subsidy on diesel to mi gate the 
effects of drought on paddy produc on. This scheme intends 
to provide support to drought-affected farmers so that they 
are not compelled to leave their land fallow. By 2013, the 
government had spent close to ₹1,923 Cr. but the scheme 
has proven to be ineffec ve in promo ng protec ve 
irriga on. Instead, it ended up being a drought relief scheme 
giving ex-gra a payment to farmers who produced a diesel 
receipt. Kishore (2015) found the scheme riddled with poor 
targe ng and high transac on costs.
A new scheme aimed at increasing irrigated area is that of 
promo ng solar irriga on pumps. In 2010, Rajasthan became 
the first state to offer 86 per cent capital subsidy on small 
solar irriga on pumps. Over the next 5 years, Rajasthan 
installed close to 20,000 solar pumps (SSEF 2015). In 2013-
14, several state governments followed suit and launched 
solar pump promo on schemes offering 70-90 per cent 
capital subsidy. Under the Bihar Saur Kran  Sinchai Yojna 
(BSKSY), 1,560 solar irriga on pumps have been deployed in 
the last three years.
2. STUDY LOCATION AND SAMPLING
BSKSY is aimed at increasing irrigated area by providing 
highly subsidized solar pumps (90 per cent capital subsidy) of 
small size (2 kWp) to farmers having one to five acres of land, 
a func onal borewell and willingness to contribute 10 per 
cent of the capital cost (₹28,000 for AC pumps and ₹29,700 
for DC pumps). In 2015, the IWMI-Tata Program recruited 
two IRMA students for a quick field study to understand if 
the scheme is taking off among farmers and if it has the 
poten al to trigger an agrarian transforma on in Bihar 
(Gupta and Kiran 2015). Interviews were conducted with 
officials of Bihar Renewable Energy Development Agency 
(BREDA), the implemen ng agency for the scheme, several 
solar pump manufacturers and NABARD officials. Thirty one 
beneficiary and thirty non-beneficiary farmers spread across 
three districts – Purnia, Kishanganj and Arariya – were 
surveyed to capture their perspec ve and assess any early 
impacts of the scheme (Table 1; Figure 1).
3. DISCUSSION
Our survey suggests that despite having a vibrant market for 
domes c solar applica ons, there is li le enthusiasm for the 
2 kWp solar irriga on pumps being offered under BSKSY. We 
tried to understand why.
Research highlight based on Pathak (2014) and Gupta and Kiran (2015).
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Table 1: Farmers surveyed across study districts







*This Highlight is based on research carried out under the IWMI-Tata Program (ITP) with addi onal support from the CGIAR Research Program on 
Water, Land and Ecosystems (WLE) and CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS). It is not externally 
peer-reviewed and the views expressed are of the author/s alone and not of ITP or its funding partners.
3.1 Scheme design and targe ng
BREDA officials reported that BSKSY is aimed at increasing 
irrigated area by providing affordable irriga on to small and 
marginal farmers. Smaller pumps are offered because the 
targeted beneficiaries are expected to have small pumping 
requirements. However, higher subsidy component limits the 
total number of pumps available which o en means that 
they end up with the influen al village elite.
In our survey we found that the average beneficiary owned 
5.48 acres of land; only marginally lower than the average 
landholding of non-beneficiary pump owners (5.68 acres). 
The 5 non-beneficiary farmers who did not own any other 
irriga on pump had an average land holding of only 3.00 
acres. Of the 31 beneficiaries, 6 had both diesel and electric 
pumps in addi on to the solar pump; and only 4 relied 
exclusively on solar. Hence, rather than making irriga on 
more accessible to small and marginal farmers, the high 
capital subsidy tends to benefit medium and large farmers 
who already have irriga on access. This o en implies that 
the pumps tend to act as “back up” pumps and are rou nely 
under-u lized. Only 4 out of 31 beneficiary farmers reported 
using their solar pumps for selling irriga on to other farmers; 
among the non-beneficiaries, the number of sellers was 9 
out of 30 (Table 2). 
Beneficiary farmers complained that due to small size, it 
takes them twice as long to irrigate a bigha (1 acre = 1.6 
bigha) compared to diesel or electric pumps; also increasing 
labour costs. Farmers argued that pump u liza on would 
improve if the limita on on pump size was removed In 2015, 
NABARD launched a scheme for 1,350 solar pumps where 
the subsidy amount per pump is fixed and the remainder is 
to be paid by the beneficiary as instalments towards a bank 
loan ( Table 3).
Given the farmers' preference for larger pumps, one would 
have expected greater interest in this scheme. However, the 
process of accessing this subsidy is complex; making it 
una rac ve to small farmers. Since its launch, only 2 farmers  
have availed solar pumps under the scheme.
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3.2 Empanelment of solar companies
MNRE (Ministry of New and Renewable Energy) empanelled 
companies that have experience of more than 3 years and 
annual turnover of more than ₹10 crores are eligible to apply 
for par cipa on under BSKSY. This creates an entry barrier 
for the new companies. Since the last three years, only five 
companies have been supplying pumps under BSKSY 
(Figure 2).
The lowest quoted price becomes the base price for BREDA 
and all empanelled companies that agree to supply pumps at 
the base price become eligible. Farmers don't get to decide 
the brand of the pump but only the type: AC or DC. 
Depending on the type and demand, BREDA allocates 
districts to different companies. This means that each eligible 
company gets supply order irrespec ve of the performance 
of their pumps or their a er sales service; 
there is li le compe  on for market share.
The unit price for solar pumps under BSKSY 
seems inflated, sugges ng some sort of 
carteliza on. BREDA pays between ₹140,000 
and ₹150,000 per kWp (₹280,000 for 2 kWp 
AC pumps and ₹297,000 for 2 kWp DC 
pumps). Corresponding prices in other states 
like Gujarat are close to ₹70,000 to ₹80,000 
per kWp. Recently, the government of 
Maharashtra put on hold their procurement of 
solar pumps when they found that Gujarat is 
procuring 5 kWp pumps at ₹350,000 (₹70,000 
per kWp) while the lowest bid they received 
was ₹540,000 (₹108,000 per kWp) (ET 2016).
The lack of compe  on is evident from the 
poor a er-sales service provided by the 
empanelled companies. Twenty nine out of 
thirty one BSKSY farmers faced performance and service 
issues once or twice in the last year. Companies claim to 
resolve the problem within 48 hours but our survey suggests 
that take around 3 weeks to repair; in some cases, this  me 
is close to three to five months. Since there is no incen ve 
for companies to establish a strong brand image, they 
neglect a er-sales service even though they get paid for it. 
BREDA claims that the process of alloca ng districts to 
companies makes it easier for them to provide service. 
However, this does not seem to be happening on the 
ground; we found several pumps in a state of disrepair with 
farmers wai ng for companies to act (Figure 3; Figure 4).
The idea of giving highly subsidized solar irriga on pumps 




Pump Owners Pump Owners Irriga on Buyers
Number of respondents 31 25 5
Average Landholding (acres) 5.48 5.68 3.00
Number of farmers having only 
solar pumps
4 - -
Number of farmers having diesel 
pumps
27 25 -
Number of farmers having diesel 
and electric pumps
6 - -
Number of farmers selling 
irriga on service
4 9 -





DC Pumps AC Pumps
2 kWp ₹ 57,600 per kWp ₹ 50,400 per kWp
2 – 5 kWp ₹ 54,000 per kWp ₹ 43,200 per kWp
5 – 10 kWp ₹ 194,400 per pump
Table 2: Profiles of beneficiary and non-beneficiary farmers
Table 3: New solar pump subsidy-cum-loan scheme introduced by 
NABARD in 2015
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since it fails to replace diesel as the main source of energy 
for irriga on. Further, in a state where most farmers are 
water buyers (Kishore 2013), providing capital subsidy to 
well owners might be inadequate to achieve the objec ve of 
enhancing irriga on access to small and marginal farmers.
4. ALTERNATIVE POLICY REGIME
The role of groundwater irriga on markets in extending 
irriga on access to resource poor farmers has been well 
documented (see Kolavalli and Chicoine 1989; Shah 1993; 
Shah and Ballabh 1997; Kahnert and Levine 1993). Simply 
put, irriga on service markets (ISMs) are an informal 
arrangement under which pump owners sell irriga on as a 
service to other farmers for a considera on. These markets 
emerge because of two reasons: [1] there are farmers who 
own or can lease in some land but do not have access to a 
well and pump; and [2] land holdings are so fragmented that 
even large farmers cannot afford to have a well and pump-
set in each parcel of land (Shah 1993). Such markets 
emerged all across India a er most states adopted the flat 
tariff regime for farm power supply (Shah 2009). Zero 
marginal cost of pumping and surplus pump capacity 
available with pump owners pushed them to sell irriga on to 
other farmers to recover the high annual flat rate. They 
invested in infrastructure like underground pipelines which 
enabled them to increase their area of opera on. In Gujarat, 
farmers started inves ng in tubewells primarily to become 
providers (ISPs). In Navali village that Shah (1993) surveyed 
in 1989, 22 ISPs had invested in 65 km of buried pipes and 
served irriga on to 1,200 acres of land belonging to 550 
farmers. In Bihar, however, the lack of grid penetra on and 
prevalence of costly diesel irriga on has restricted the 
emergence of vibrant and compe  ve ISMs. Instead, pump 
owners or ISPs enjoy strong monopoly power, and pumps are 
used more for power than for profit (Shah and Ballabh 1997, 
Dubash 1995).
A reasonable farm power supply environment coupled with 
high flat tariffs can provide a conducive environment for self-
perpetua ng, vibrant and compe  ve irriga on ins tu ons 
that benefit small and marginal farmers. However, rural 
electrifica on is unlikely to happen soon in Bihar despite the 
best inten ons of the newly elected Bihar government. It is 
also likely that the rising farm power subsidy bills in western 
and peninsular India might convince state governments in 
eastern India to insist on universal metering of tubewells 
rather than flat tariffs, as seen in West Bengal. The 
emergence of solar irriga on pumps offers an alterna ve 
model for catalysing equitable ISMs and energizing 
agriculture. By offering clean and zero marginal cost power 
albeit at high ini al investment, solar pumps beau fully 
simulate the high flat tariff regime that catalysed irriga on 
markets in the past. 
4.1 The Nalanda Experiment
Solar pumps came into the limelight in Bihar with a pilot 
project of the Department of Minor Water Resources in 
2012. Thirty four public tubewells of 7.5 HP each located in 
20 villages of Nalanda district were solarized by Claro 
Energy. The new source of energy (solar panels) and 
addi onal infrastructure was integrated with the exis ng 
water distribu on network. An operator was appointed by 
the government to provide irriga on to the nearby farmers 
at ₹5 per katha (1 acre = 32 katha). The operator was also 
responsible for the maintenance of the pump. Field studies 
by ITP in 2012 and 2014 (Tiwary 2012; Shah et al. 2014; 
Pathak 2014) indicated that this arrangement provided 
assured and inexpensive day- me irriga on to small and 
marginal farmers. An 8 kWp solar pump could irrigate 0.6 – 
1.0 acre in a day, which meant providing irriga on to 15-25 
small farmers with fragmented land holdings.
The arrangement worked well technically but ins tu onal 
hiccups prevented the pilots from reaching its poten al. The 
operators were appointed on a fixed monthly salary of 
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Figure 3: Performance of empanelled companies on a er-sales 
services (N=31)
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₹2,500 and did not have any incen ve to maximize irrigated 
area. As a result, in most cases, they did not maintain the 
distribu on network or solar pump well. No one from the 
government or Claro Energy went back to the pilots to 
collect the revenue and to pay salaries to operators a er the 
ini al installa on. In some villages, the operators started 
working as entrepreneurs and treated irriga on revenue as 
their income; this incen vized them to maximize sales. In 
such cases, they invested private capital to maintain and 
expand the distribu on network. Where possible, some 
operators also raised irriga on tariffs; in 7 randomly selected 
loca ons, Pathak (2014) found that the price charged for 
irriga on was increased by the operators to ₹10-12 per 
katha. Some water buyers even claimed to pay ₹15 per katha. 
The price of diesel irriga on worked out to be around ₹20 
per katha. Irriga on from solar pump no longer remained 
inexpensive. Operators preferred to maximize their short-
term income by charging higher tariffs rather than by 
expanding irrigated area which would have required be er 
management of the pump and distribu on system. They 
could monopolise irriga on service because there were few 
or no electric pumps in the village and diesel irriga on 
con nued to be more costly.
Although the Nalanda experiment provided an addi onal 
income source for the pump operators, it missed the 
achievable goal of offering reliable and affordable irriga on 
to small and marginal farmers. Despite missing the bull's eye, 
the Nalanda experiment suggests a prac cal model for 
retuning BSKSY.
4.2 The Economics of Solar ISPs
In Table 4, we compare three scenarios on counts of subsidy 
burden; solar pump u liza on; and total area likely to be 
irrigated. The first case presents the 'business-as-usual' 
scenario with the current BSKSY subsidy regime. We 
compare 4 farmers with 2 kWp pumps acquired under 
BSKSY 90 per cent subsidy scheme. Given land 
fragmenta on and the small size of pumps, the BSKSY 
beneficiaries are unable to irrigate a lot of land and their 
pumps remain idle (or are only used as backup pumps) for 
most of the year. The subsidy burden is very high (90 per 
cent) as is the unit cost of solar pumps (₹140,000 per kWp). 
We find that the cost of adding an addi onal hectare of gross 
irrigated area comes to ₹186,667.
The second case presents the 'base' scenario for solar ISPs 
and is based on the current pumping behaviour of NABARD 
public tubewells in Nalanda. This would require addi onal 
Solar pump size and opera ons
Business as usual
[4 * 2 kWp]
Solar ISP (BASE)
[1 * 8 kWp]
Solar ISP (MAX)
[1 * 8 kWp]
Size of the solar pump(s) 2 kWp * 4 pumps 8 kWp 8 kWp
Unit cost of solar pump ₹140,000/kWp ₹70,000/kWp ₹70,000/kWp
Total cost of the pump ₹1,120,000 ₹560,000 ₹560,000
Capital cost of buried pipelines - ₹200,000 ₹200,000
Area irrigated in one day per pump 6 katha / 0.2 acre 20 katha / 0.6 acre 32 katha / 1.0 acre
No. of days pump is run in a year 80 days 200 days 300 days
Price of irriga on per katha ₹12 ₹12 ₹12
Financial model    
Subsidy 90 per cent ₹40,000/kWp ₹40,000/kWp
Total subsidy burden for 8 kWp
(including buried pipelines)
₹1,008,000 ₹520,000 ₹520,000
Down payment by beneficiaries / solar ISP 10 % ₹10,000/kWp ₹10,000/kWp
Down payment by beneficiaries / solar ISP ₹112,000 ₹80,000 ₹80,000
Loan ( 20,000/kWp)₹ - ₹160,000 ₹160,000
Life of asset 20-25 years 20-25 years 20-25 years
Loan repayment  me - 10 years 10 years
Interest rate on loan# - 7.0 % 7.0 %
Expected annual returns    
Area irrigated in a year 1,920 katha / 24 Ha 4,000 katha / 50 Ha 9,600 katha / 120 Ha
Gross irrigated area 
(assuming 4 irriga ons per unit of land)
6.00 Ha 12.50 Ha 30.00 Ha
Capital investment per hectare of addi onal gross irrigated area ₹186,667 ₹60,800 ₹32,000
Number of farmers served 10-12 30-40 60-70
Revenue from irriga on sales ₹8,000 ₹48,000 ₹115,200
Payment towards loan repayment - ₹22,296 ₹22,296
Gross annual income for solar ISP - ₹25,704 ₹92,904
Table 4: Economics of BSKSY and solar ISP model scenarios
# Rate for agriculture lending is 7% for loans less than ₹300,000.
5
Water Policy Research Highlight-03
investment in buried pipelines network. With the network, 
the 8 kWp solar tubewells can irrigate 20 katha per day and 
operate 200 days in a year; their annual revenue would be 
₹48,000 and a er deduc ng the payment towards loan 
repayment (₹22,296), the net annual income would be 
₹25,704. In this scenario, the cost of adding an addi onal 
hectare of gross irrigated area is ₹60,800.
The third case presents the 'max' scenario for solar ISPs. 
Since the Nalanda pump operators did not invest in the solar 
pumps, they neither had much stake nor any incen ve to run 
the pumps as a maximizing enterprise. If they did, 
compe  ve ISMs would have emerged. We believe that if 
the pump operators are organized as solar entrepreneurs, 
rather than fixed-salary earning employees, they would strive 
to maximize irrigated area and their incomes. This would 
require extending the buried pipelines network through 
some more investment so that the solar ISP would be able to 
irrigate 32 katha per day and operate for 300 days in a year. 
The annual revenue from irriga on sale would be ₹115,200 
and a er adjus ng for loan repayment, the solar ISP would 
make an annual gross profit of ₹92,904 (or a monthly income 
in excess of ₹7,500).
Promo ng several solar ISPs in a village or cluster of 
con guous villages will also promote compe  on among the 
ISPs to capture the largest share of the ISM. This will ensure 
that the irriga on prices are affordable for buyers (small and 
marginal farmers) and the quality of service delivery is high. 
We believe this would be a be er way of ensuring access to 
affordable irriga on.
4.3 BAU vs. Solar ISPs
By mimicking a high flat tariff regime, solar pumps can 
catalyse vibrant irriga on service markets. In Table 4 we saw 
how the economics of the proposed solar ISP model is 
superior to the current subsidy regime. The model also offers 
greater ease in implementa on and has several advantages 
over the status quo (Table 5 ). One, it will significantly reduce 
the transac on costs of delivering subsidy for the 
government since the department will deal with fewer 8 kWp 
solar ISP compared to large number of 2 kWp farmers. It will 
also reduce the transac on costs of accessing subsidy since 
small and marginal farmers will have access to the benefits of 
affordable irriga on without having to go through complex 
procedures and protocols. Two, it will create a cadre of solar 
entrepreneurs who can earn a reasonable livelihood out of 
this. Three, implementa on in clusters will make it easier and 
more economical for solar companies to provide a er-sales 
service.
Further, the solar ISP model can help the government of 
Bihar achieve its goal of rapid rural electrifica on. Investment 
required in extending grid power supply for domes c 
consump on is nearly a third of what is required for 
providing farm power supply since domes c electrical loads 
are lower. A 1 MW addi onal capacity can service close to 
500 domes c power connec ons or it can accommodate 
around 200 farm power connec ons. If farm sector is 
energized using solar ISPs, grid penetra on can be expedited 
for domes c sector. It is also important to note that the 
capacity u liza on of grid infrastructure is much lower due 
to the intermi ent agricultural demand; domes c demand is 
near-constant throughout the year and ensures higher grid 
capacity u liza on.
5. REINVENTING BSKSY
Our analysis suggests that ISMs can achieve the twin 
objec ves of increasing irrigated area and offering affordable 
Parameters BAU: BSKSY subsidy regime Solar ISP Model
Catalysing vibrant, compe  ve and equitable groundwater 
ISMs
No Yes
Promote irriga on entrepreneurs No Yes
Subsidy burden per MWp of solar pump capacity ₹12.6 crores ₹4.0 crores
Capital investment per hectare of addi onal gross irrigated 
area
₹186,667 ₹32,000 - ₹60,800
Subsidy burden per hectare of addi onal gross irrigated area ₹168,000 ₹28,800 - ₹41,600
Addi onal net income from sale of irriga on service
₹5,000 – ₹10,000 
per farmer per annum
₹30,000 – ₹90,000 
per solar ISP per annum
Number of farmers serviced per MWp solar capacity 1000 – 1500 4500 – 8000
Addi onal gross irrigated area per MWp solar capacity 750 Ha 1600 – 3750 Ha
Cost of irriga on for buyers ₹12 per katha ₹12 per katha
Transac on costs of subsidy delivery for government High Low
Transac on costs of a er-sales service delivery for companies High Low
Transac on costs of accessing subsidy for farmers High Low
Capacity u liza on of irriga on infrastructure Very Low High – Very High
Capacity u liza on of grid infrastructure Low High
Table 5: Comparison between BAU and solar ISP model
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and reliable irriga on to small and marginal farmers. BSKSY 
can be tweaked to trigger vibrant ISMs which could be a game-
changer for Bihar's agriculture. Some features that can be 
incorporated are:
1. At present, BSKSY is designed to reach out to maximum 
number of farmers by offering high capital subsidies on 
small individual pumps. The solar ISP model presents an 
alterna ve to reach many more farmers indirectly by 
subsidizing the crea on of irriga on enterprises and 
catalysing compe  ve irriga on ins tu ons.
2. For kick star ng ISM, the pumps should be large enough 
to permit a viable solar ISP enterprise. A pump size of 8-
10 kWp would be needed to create an irriga on poten al 
large enough to support an irriga on enterprise. 
3. In order for the ISP to maximize irrigated area, each ISP 
should be equipped with a piped water distribu on 
system cu ng across neighbouring fields.
4. A compact area of 80-100 ha should be supported by 6-8 
such solar ISPs with overlapping command areas such 
that each buyer has the op on of buying from several 
solar ISPs. 
5. A flat subsidy of ₹40,000 per kWp coupled with a 
financial loan product which allows the solar ISP to pay 
annual instalments towards the cost of the pump can 
serve the purpose. The annual instalment will act as a 
high flat tariff and incen vize the ISP to maximize 
irriga on sales.
6. With reduced and fixed capital subsidy per kWp, the 
farmer will have a larger stake in the pump and therefore 
should be allowed to select the brand of pump s/he 
wants to install. This will also encourage farmers and 
solar companies to nego ate a be er price and a er sales 
services. 
7. The solar ISP should be an independent enterprise and 
not an employee of the government, as was the case in 
Nalanda. This way, the ISPs' incen ves would be directly 
linked to sale of irriga on.
There is also scope for third party involvement in this model. 
An NGO or private developer can lease out solar pumps to 
ISPs at an annual tariff or lease amount. Such an agency can 
also provide a range of ancillary services such as training of 
ISPs, maintenance and servicing of solar pumps etc. If BSKSY 
is able to catalyse compe  ve irriga on service markets, it 
will achieve mul ple policy objec ves. Not only will this 
ensure improved irriga on access to small and marginal 
farmers, it will also energize and rejuvenate the agrarian 
economy, restore agrarian dynamism, increase agricultural 
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About the IWMI-Tata Program and Water Policy Highlights
The IWMI-Tata Water Policy Program (ITP) was launched in 
2000 as a co-equal partnership between the Interna onal 
Water Management Ins tute (IWMI), Colombo and Sir Ratan 
Tata Trust (SRTT), Mumbai. The program presents new 
perspec ves and prac cal solu ons derived from the wealth 
of research done in India on water resource management. Its 
objec ve is to help policy makers at the central, state and local 
levels address their water challenges – in areas such as 
sustainable groundwater management, water scarcity, and 
rural poverty – by transla ng research findings into prac cal 
policy recommenda ons. Through this program, IWMI 
collaborates with a range of partners across India to iden fy, 
analyze and document relevant water management 
approaches and current prac ces. These prac ces are 
assessed and synthesized for maximum policy impact in the 
series on Water Policy Highlights and IWMI-Tata Comments.
Water Policy Highlights are pre-publica on discussion papers 
developed primarily as the basis for discussion during ITP's 
Annual Partners' Meet. The research underlying these 
Highlights was funded with support from Interna onal Water 
Management Ins tute (IWMI), Tata Trusts, CGIAR Research 
Program on Water, Land and Ecosystems (WLE) and CGIAR 
Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food 
Security (CCAFS). However, the Highlights are not externally 
peer-reviewed and the views expressed are of the author/s 
alone and not of ITP or any of its funding partners.
